In a post on his X account on Saturday, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi reacted to the IAEA’s latest report on the status of Iran’s nuclear program, and addressed comments by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi regarding the lack of access to some damaged facilities, the status of Iran’s uranium stockpiles, and the issue of the alleged “loss of continuity of knowledge” in Iran’s nuclear program.
Gharibabadi said Grossi speaks of “ambiguity,” “lack of access,” and “loss of continuity of knowledge,” but this situation “did not arise in a vacuum.” He noted that nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards had been targeted in military attacks by the United States and the Israeli regime, adding that the agency’s chief, who had shown himself to be “completely under the influence of the United States and the West,” never condemned those attacks.
He said it was unacceptable to ignore the source of the disruption and then use its consequences against Iran.
The deputy foreign minister added that if the issue is verification and non-proliferation, the first expectation from the IAEA director general should be a clear legal position against attacks on safeguarded facilities. Such attacks, he said, are not only a violation of Iran’s sovereignty but also a direct blow to nuclear safety, the safeguards system, and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.
He questioned whether Grossi had the courage to finally take a position against an action by the US that violated international law and the United Nations Charter. Gharibabadi further argued that, given the director general’s political approach and dependence, Grossi could not be expected to independently and professionally manage the UN if he seeks the organization’s top post.
Gharibabadi also criticized the repeated reference to Iran’s 60-percent uranium enrichment level and discussions of possible weaponization scenarios, saying such arguments were “more political than technical” when presented without a precise legal framework.
He noted that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not establish a numerical ceiling for enrichment levels and said the legal criterion is whether nuclear materials and activities are diverted toward military purposes. He underlined that Iran’s nuclear program has remained peaceful and the country has acted within its legal commitments.
He further argued that the IAEA cannot simultaneously report on the effects of military attacks, ignore the responsibility of those behind them, and then ask Iran to bear the technical and political costs of the insecurity created by the aggressors. “This is neither verification nor confidence-building,” he said.
According to Gharibabadi, if the agency wants to be part of a diplomatic solution, it must avoid turning technical reports into instruments of political pressure. He said safeguards are not strengthened through military action, threats, or resolutions, but rather through impartiality, respect for international law, respect for state sovereignty, and the explicit condemnation of attacks on facilities monitored by the IAEA.
He concluded by saying that safeguarded facilities cannot be bombed, the access and safety conditions necessary for inspections cannot be destroyed, and then the consequences of those same attacks cannot be used as grounds for raising ambiguity against Iran.