The United States has developed a global network of roughly 750 military bases and facilities across 80 countries and territories.
Before launching major military operations, Washington has traditionally accumulated large stocks of equipment and supplies at bases near targeted countries and potential theaters of war.
That strategy has relied heavily on the assumption that US air superiority and defensive systems would protect those bases from sustained attacks.
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US bases generally remained operational despite attacks by armed groups.
The US-imposed war on Iran, however, has demonstrated the growing ability of Iran to challenge that assumption through the use of missiles and drones capable of striking American military infrastructure across a wide geographic area.
According to a recent Defense Department inspector general report cited in the source material, Iranian strikes damaged or destroyed hundreds of buildings and structures at US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman and Jordan.
The report also said dozens of US aircraft were destroyed or damaged.
In particular, Naval Support Activity Bahrain, the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet, was knocked out of action on Feb. 28, the first day of the imposed war.
“They blew the hell out of Bahrain,” acting Navy secretary Hung Cao said recently.
“We’re not getting back in there anytime soon,” Adm. Daryl Caudle, chief of naval operations, told a Navy town hall.
The damage to Bahrain also produced major logistical consequences for US forces deployed in the region.
With the Bahrain port rendered inoperable, the US Navy had to rely on its base at Diego Garcia, about 2,200 miles away, to support its fleet in the Middle East.
The longer supply route increased costs and reduced the frequency with which supplies could reach US warships, while normal port calls became increasingly difficult.
The USS Abraham Lincoln subsequently spent nine months at sea, while the prolonged deployment placed severe pressure on personnel.
Eight members of the carrier strike group attempted suicide during the deployment, according to the source material.
The Iranian response has also raised broader questions about the ability of the United States to sustain overseas military operations against a capable missile and drone power.
China possesses substantially larger missile and drone capabilities than Iran, meaning similar attacks could pose a major challenge to US bases in Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii.
A widespread disruption of those facilities could severely complicate US military operations in a potential war involving Taiwan.
Iran’s attacks have underscored how the proliferation of relatively inexpensive drones and missiles is making fixed military infrastructure increasingly vulnerable.
Advances in artificial intelligence-guided weapons could further intensify that threat.
One possible response would be to reduce the number of vulnerable forward bases, although such a move could carry significant strategic and political consequences for Washington.
US overseas bases also serve as a visible military commitment to allied countries, signaling that an attack on an ally could directly involve American forces.
At the same time, strengthening existing bases could provide another response to the growing threat exposed by Iran’s strikes.
That would include expanding hardened shelters and bunkers for personnel, aircraft and supplies, while improving passive protection against missile and drone attacks.
The disparity in military infrastructure is particularly apparent in the Indo-Pacific.
A Hudson Institute study cited in the source material found that China had constructed more than 3,000 hardened and unhardened aircraft shelters since the early 2010s, while the United States had constructed only 43 aircraft shelters within 1,000 nautical miles of Taiwan, excluding South Korea.
The financial cost of the US-imposed war on Iran has also complicated efforts to allocate resources toward long-term military infrastructure.
The source material estimates that the war has already cost the United States $43.6 billion, with the total continuing to rise.
Iran’s attacks have also exposed shortcomings in the US approach to air defense.
During Iranian strikes, US and allied forces reportedly relied heavily on expensive guided interceptors to destroy comparatively inexpensive drones.
During one Iranian attack on a US air base in Jordan, US forces reportedly fired 60 to 70 Patriot missiles and more than a dozen THAAD interceptors.
Such expenditures can rapidly consume limited stocks of air-defense munitions, potentially leaving US forces more exposed in future confrontations with other major military powers.
The same resource constraints could also affect Washington’s ability to support partners facing missile and drone attacks elsewhere.
Expanding the US inventory of long-range drones could provide another option by allowing some operations to be conducted without relying on bases located close to a target.
Unlike manned aircraft and large concentrations of personnel, drones require fewer forward logistical resources and can potentially be launched from submarines or mobile units that are more difficult to detect.
The broader lesson emerging from Iran’s resistance is that Washington can no longer assume that fixed military bases near a battlefield are secure.
The US-imposed war on Iran has demonstrated that relatively inexpensive missiles and drones can impose significant costs on a military power that has long relied on extensive overseas bases and concentrated logistics.
Iran’s strikes have therefore exposed a strategic vulnerability extending beyond the Persian Gulf, forcing Washington to reconsider how it deploys forces, protects military infrastructure and prepares for future wars against capable adversaries.